![]() The ‘merely’ here is doing a hefty bit of work: it distinguishes the laws of the regularity theorist from the more metaphysically robust laws of her interlocutors, who I will call ‘modalists’. The regularity theory holds that laws of nature are merely generalizations. I hope here to show that a modified regularity theory can overcome this difficulty. However, some external critics have argued that the BSA’s reliance on strength and simplicity don’t connect with the practice of science so the regularity theory must be abandoned. Instead, I’ll be arguing that the current incarnation of the regularity theory cannot cleave the laws from the accidental truths. I will not address criticisms from proponents of more metaphysically robust accounts of laws. Recognizing this allows us to more accurately explicate the theoretical virtues scientists seek in laws and thereby explain our preference for dynamic laws. Laws must be discovered empirically by limited agents operating locally. I will clearly diagnose why the BSA falls short: the BSA puts too little focus on induction. I’ll then present two arguments against it. I’ll open by showing the commitments of the view, in its now canonical form: Lewis’s BSA of law. I will show that, in its current iteration, it fails to correctly differentiate between laws and boundary conditions. In this article, I will examine one of the most prominent philosophical theories of natural law: the Mill–Ramsey–Lewis best system account (hereafter ‘the BSA’). And we can give a philosophical account in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. 1 We can appeal to examples: Schrödinger’s equation, Einstein’s field equations, Newton’s equations of motion. Laws are those generalizations that underwrite counterfactuals, licence predictions, feature in explanation, and are primarily discovered via empirical inquiry. But not all universal generalizations are laws. Finally, I discuss the significance of Humean supervenience in a context where Neo-Humeanism is rejected.What are laws of nature? They are universal generalizations. While my account is consistent with the thesis of Humean supervenience, I argue that it need not be interpreted as a Neo-Humean account in any interesting sense. ![]() I argue that this account enjoys the advantages alleged for all other extant accounts of laws while avoiding many of their flaws. The basic idea behind this account is that a law of nature is a proposition that must be presupposed by any theoretical account of the reliability of any method of measuring some physical quantity. In the second half of the dissertation, I present and defend a novel account of laws of nature that is consistent with Humean supervenience. Along the way, I show that two putative knock-down arguments against Humean supervenience are unsound, I show how Lewis's "Best-System Analysis" of laws can be remedied of its most prominent flaws while remaining true to Humean supervenience, and I criticize the "Universals Account" of laws defended by Armstrong, Dretske and Tooley. Roughly the first half of the dissertation is devoted to refuting this pessimistic claim. Other philosophers, such as Carroll, argue that no adequate account of laws could be consistent with Humean supervenience. Earman argues that Humean supervenience poses an "empiricist loyalty test on laws." I concur, for as I argue, consistency with Humean supervenience is a necessary condition for upholding a plausible minimal empiricism concerning the methodology of science. This is the thesis that the facts about the laws of nature must supervene on the particular, occurrent facts about the actual world. Many philosophers insist that any adequate philosophical account of laws of nature must be consistent with Humean supervenience about the nomic.
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